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The European Public Prosecutor’s Office:  




Pursuant to Article 86 TFEU, in July 2013 the Commission issued a Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), i.e. the European body 
that shall be empowered to investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the financial interests of the 
EU. This contribution analyses the most relevant features of the (probably) forthcoming Office, as 
it is envisaged in the text currently under negotiation in the Council.  
The EPPO will extensively depend upon national law, not only because the defendants will be tried 
before domestic courts, but also because the final text is expected to include only a limited number 
of rules regulating the investigations and the prosecutions of the Office. This contribution looks at 
the EPPO mainly from this perspective of the problematic intersection of EU law and national law, 
evaluating whether such a mixed regulation is functional to the aim of guaranteeing a better 
protection of EU financial interests.  
Being the first European body competent to adopt decisions vis-à-vis the individuals in the sensitive 
field of criminal law, the EPPO could represent a Copernican revolution in the history of EU 
(criminal) law. However, the analysis shows that this potentially revolutionary leap forward has 
turned out to be quite complicated. It is contentious that the Office – with the currently envisaged 
structure and powers – will enhance the fight against crimes affecting the financial interests of the 
Union, so that the need of establishing such a new body should be carefully assessed. 
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1. Introduction 
The rationale behind the idea of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO or the ‘Office’) is 
straightforward yet ground-breaking. Since a relevant part of the financial resources of the 
European Union are annually lost because of fraud committed throughout the member states, 
a European body competent to investigate such illegal conduct is assumed to be needed. 
Should the EPPO be set up, a Copernican revolution in the history of EU (criminal) law will take 
place: for the first time, an EU body could adopt decisions vis-à-vis the individuals in the field of 
criminal law. However, the practical realisation of this potentially revolutionary leap forward 
has turned out to be quite complicated.  
At the time of publishing this paper, the Office does not yet exist. Article 86 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) allows the Council – with the previous consent 
of the European Parliament – to set up the EPPO by means of regulations. Pursuant to this 
Article, the Commission tabled a proposal for a Council Regulation in July 2013 (‘Commission’s 
proposal’)1 and negotiations are ongoing. At the end of September 2016, the Presidency of the 
Council made clear that the compromise reached on some provisions would not have been 
substantially altered.2 In this contribution, only the most sensitive issues of the text currently 
under negotiation (‘draft Regulation’)3 are addressed.   
Before embarking on the analysis of the draft Regulation, however, it needs to be underlined 
that the (probably) forthcoming EPPO has kept the basic structure that has always been 
conceived as the most politically suitable for such an Office: it will be empowered to investigate 
and prosecute crimes affecting financial interests of the EU (‘PIF offences’),4 but the trial is not 
supposed to take place at the supranational level. Investigations shall be carried out under the 
direction of an EU body, but the ensuing trial is held before national courts. This peculiar 
embedding of the EPPO in national systems is likely to pose several problems, because “the 
rules relating to the investigations and prosecutions on the one hand and trials on the other 
                                                     
1 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, COM(2013) 
534 final, 17 July 2013. 
2 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Policy 
debate/Partial general approach, Council doc. 12775/16, 30 September 2016, p. 2.  
3 The last version publicly available of the draft Regulation at the time of writing is: Proposal for a Regulation on 
the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Draft Regulation, Council doc. 5766/17, 31 January 
2017. 
4 PIF stands for “protection des intérêts financiers”. 
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cannot be separated any more than eggs can be extracted from omelettes”.5 Moreover, 
national law remains applicable during the investigations to the extent that a matter is not 
regulated by the Regulation:6 since a very limited part of the activities of the EPPO is dealt with 
by the text under negotiation, the role that national laws will play in the frame of the 
functioning of the Office is relevant.  
Therefore, this contribution looks at the EPPO mainly from the perspective of the problematic 
balance and intersection of EU law and national law, evaluating whether such a mixed regulation 
of the activities of the forthcoming Office is functional to the aim of guaranteeing a better 
protection of EU financial interests.7  
After a brief history of the path that has led to the current scenario (section 2), this paper 
focuses on the reasons why the EPPO is perceived as a necessary instrument to fight PIF 
offences (section 3) and on some peculiarities of the procedures set out in Article 86 TFEU 
(section 4). The analysis then shifts to the material competence of the EPPO (section 5). Section 
6 deals with the structure and status of the forthcoming Office, whereas the main rules 
concerning EPPO investigations and prosecutions are respectively discussed in sections 7 and 
8. The sensitive issue of the procedural safeguards is also addressed, under the perspective 
both of the procedural rights of persons involved in the proceedings of the EPPO (section 9.1) 
and of the judicial review of acts and decisions of the Office (section 9.2). Section 10 is devoted 
to the expected relations of the EPPO with its partners. Some conclusions are finally drawn in 
section 11, where the expected limited impact of the draft Regulation on the existing scenario 
is highlighted. 
2. A brief history of the EPPO 
“Protecting taxpayers’ money against fraud”.8 This was the title of the Commission’s press 
release of 17 July 2013, when the proposal for a Council Regulation on the EPPO was issued. 
The symbolic meaning behind the establishment of the EPPO is self-evident: the Commission 
wants to reassure European citizens that, bluntly put, the EU will take care of their money. 
Moreover, it is plain that the EU budget “represents the ‘common interest’ par excellence, an 
interest that is ipsa natura supranational and whose need for the protection transcends 
national frontiers”.9 The protection of the budget comes first among the priorities of the EU: 
once it is protected, the EU can carry out its tasks; if this is not the case, the organisation is 
                                                     
5 Peers (2011), p. 860.  
6 Article 5(3) draft Regulation.  
7 In light of the chosen perspective, this contribution does not address other relevant topics concerning the 
functioning of the EPPO, such as the data protection regime. 
8 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-709_en.htm. 
9 De Angelis (1999), p. 9. On the EU financial interests as legal interests directly linked with the very existence of 
the EU, see also, among the many, Grasso (2008), p. 4. 
THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE: KING WITHOUT KINGDOM? | 3 
 
sentenced to an unacceptable stasis, or even to death. In other words, the budget represents 
a “quintessential”10 interest of the Union and PIF offences are “genuine European crimes”.11 
Nevertheless, until the Treaty of Lisbon, Commission efforts to introduce an ad hoc legal basis 
in the Treaties for the establishment of the EPPO were in vain. For example, at the beginning 
of the 2000s, the Commission proposed introducing in the Treaties such a legal basis to the 
Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms, which was responsible for the draft of 
the Treaty of Nice (2001).12 The Commission tabled this proposal also on the basis of the Corpus 
Juris, i.e. the ‘European micro-code’ drafted by a group of eight experts of national criminal law 
and Community law, in the frame of a project launched in 1995 by the Director of the twentieth 
General Directorate of the Commission.13 However, the Commission’s proposal was not 
accepted and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) remained silent on the matter, but it was 
amended to take into account the establishment of the judicial cooperation unit (Eurojust), 
which was set up – in its embryonic form – in 2000.14  
The Commission did not give up and at the end of 2001 it issued a Green Paper on criminal law 
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European 
prosecutor, with the aim of launching a public debate on the issue.15 Eventually, the 
perseverance of the Commission was rewarded during the negotiations that led to the 
Constitutional Treaty, signed in Rome in 2004. In its Article III-274, the Constitution for Europe 
provided a legal basis to establish the EPPO and this proviso became Article 86 TFEU.  
The clear opposition between the enthusiasm of the Commission and the cold reactions of the 
member states is underpinned by the traditional reluctance of the latter to give up their 
sovereignty in the sensitive field of criminal law; in addition, it seems that the real need to 
establish the EPPO is not unanimously perceived by politicians, practitioners and academics. 
                                                     
10 Mitsilegas (2009), p. 67. 
11 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, SWD (2013) 274 final, 17 July 2013 
(‘EPPO Impact Assessment’), p. 12. 
12 Commission of the European Communities, Additional contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference on 
institutional reforms. The criminal protection of the Community’s financial interests: a European Prosecutor, 
COM(2000) 608 final, 29 September 2000.  
13 See Delmas-Marty (under the direction of) (1997); Delmas-Marty and Vervaele (eds) (2000). Unlike the current 
draft Regulation, the Corpus Juris laid down both provisions of substantive criminal law concerning PIF offences 
and procedural rules concerning the functioning and the powers of a possible European Public Prosecutor. 
14 See Article 31 TEU as replaced by the Treaty of Nice. An embryonic version of Eurojust (‘pro-Eurojust’) was 
established with the Council Decision of 14 December 2000 setting up a Provisional Judicial Cooperation Unit, OJ 
L324/2, 21.12.2000. Eurojust was then officially set up with Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L63/1, 6.3.2002. See more below, 
section 3.  
15 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of 
the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, COM(2001) 715 final, 11 December 2001 (‘Green 
Paper’). The results of this consultation can be found in the Follow-up Report on the Green Paper on criminal-law 
protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor, 
COM(2003) 128 final, 19 March 2003 (‘Follow-up Report’).  
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3. The EPPO as a necessary instrument to fight PIF offences: Highlights of a 
long-standing postulate 
The question of whether the EU really needs the EPPO to guarantee stronger protection of its 
financial interests cannot be dealt with in depth in this contribution; however, two points need 
to be made.  
First, the numbers. In the Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal, the Commission 
argues that a huge amount of EU money is annually lost or diverted because of fraud. However, 
the quantification of similar losses is not – and can never – be precise: “one would be foolish if 
one demanded an exact sum for the level of fraud in the EU today: by definition fraudulent 
activities are meant to remain in the shadows”.16 The estimates occasionally presented are only 
the “tip of the iceberg”17 of the real phenomenon: they range from €500 million (at least)18 to 
€3 billion per year, the latter being the EPPO Impact Assessment’s estimate.19  
For the supporters of the EPPO, this lack of precise data suggests that the real scale of the 
problem could be much bigger than the available information shows and that the EU should be 
better equipped to fight these crimes. On the other hand, the uncertainty could have suggested 
other ways to solve the problem, rather than opting for the establishment of a brand new body. 
For instance, fraud could be first prevented through prevention measures; whereas 
“prosecution is secondary, the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office is at best 
tertiary”.20  
In the Commission’s view, moreover, the risks to the EU budget are even greater in light of the 
growing involvement of criminal organisations. However, it has been rebutted that a significant 
part of the financial losses of the EU is actually due to the (minor) fraud committed by national 
or local groups, within the national borders and for limited amounts of money.21 Such minor 
fraud usually falls even below the threshold of reporting duties of the member states.22 In a 
sort of vicious circle, not even the amount of the ‘local dimension’ of EU fraud is easy to assess, 
and reliable data are still lacking. 
Second, relevant changes have occurred in the field of EU criminal law in recent years; 
nevertheless, the existing instruments to which national authorities can resort have not been 
                                                     
16 Xanthaki (2010), p. 133 (emphasis added).  
17 White (1998), p. 223; Spencer (2000), p. 79.   
18 Asselineau (2014), p. 7. 
19 Commission, EPPO Impact Assessment, cit., p. 7.  
20 German Federal Bar and German Bar Association (2012), p. 1 (emphasis added). 
21 Tupman (2010), p. 155. See also Fijnaut and Groenhuijsen (2002).  
22 EU legislation requires the member states to report to the Commission all the detected irregularities concerning 
EU resources. For an extensive list of instruments which provide this duty see: European Commission, 
Methodology regarding the statistical evaluation of reported irregularities for 2011, Accompanying the Report 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the Protection of the European Union’s 
financial interests – Fight against frauds 2011 – Annual Report (Staff Working Document), SWD(2012) 230 final, 
19 July 2012, p. 4 
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deemed appropriate to tackle PIF offences. As it stated in 2003, the Commission still believes 
that the other EU bodies “are essential but serve other purposes”.23 This goes for Eurojust, 
Europol and OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office).  
In a nutshell, the mission of Eurojust is to support and coordinate national prosecuting 
authorities when they deal with investigations and prosecutions of cross-border crimes. 
Eurojust was established some years after Europol, i.e. the EU agency with the similar objective 
of supporting and strengthening action by the competent police authorities of the member 
states and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious cross-border crime.24 
Europol has also an important role concerning intelligence, since its main task is represented 
by the analysis of (personal) data relevant for the ongoing investigations at the national level.25 
Eurojust and Europol are therefore supporting bodies, which aim to facilitate the activities of 
national authorities coping with transnational criminality. The EPPO will instead have the power 
to prosecute persons suspected to have committed PIF offences.  
OLAF was formally set up by the Commission in 1999 to replace UCLAF (Unité de coordination 
de la lutte anti-fraude) and it is not a prosecution body but rather an office of the European 
Commission.26 It only carries out administrative investigations of ‘internal’ fraud, i.e. occurring 
within the EU institutions, and ‘external’ fraud, i.e. committed in the member states. When 
criminal conduct is detected, OLAF refers the case to national competent authorities, even 
though the rate of successful prosecutions based on the investigations of OLAF is currently 
regarded as unsatisfactory.27 
Moreover, in comparison with the times of the Corpus Juris, many legal instruments have also 
been adopted in order to enhance judicial and police cooperation among national authorities.28 
One could think, for instance, of the Framework Decision regarding the Joint Investigations 
Teams (JITs)29 or the whole raft of Framework Decisions and Directives concerning mutual 
                                                     
23 Commission, Follow-up Report, cit., p. 9.  
24 Article 3(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L135/53, 24.5.2016 (‘Europol 
Regulation’).  
25 According to Article 4(1) Europol Regulation, the first of Europol’s tasks is “to collect, store, process, analyse and 
exchange information, including criminal intelligence”.  
26 Commission of the European Communities, Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud Office 
(OLAF), OJ L316/20, 31.5.1999. 
27 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission’s proposal, p. 2.  
28 For a broader analysis of the developments occurred in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from the times 
of the Corpus Juris see Ligeti (2011), pp. 134-144. 
29 Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, OJ L162/1, 20.6.2002, 
which was adopted after the 2001 attacks in New York to compensate for the slow ratification of the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (OJ C197/1, 
12.7.2000), whose Article 13 already provided the legal basis for the setting up of JITs at the EU level. 
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recognition instruments, from the European Arrest Warrant to the recent European 
Investigation Order.30  
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the Commission’s proposal has been opposed 
by national parliaments, which triggered the so-called ‘yellow card procedure’: some of them 
objected that the text issued by the Commission did not comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity. However, the Commission decided to maintain the proposal, restating what had 
been already argued in the Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal of July 2013 and 
rejecting all the objections raised by national parliaments.31  
4. Article 86 TFEU and the procedure of enhanced cooperation 
Article 86 TFEU requires that the Regulation on the EPPO is adopted with a special legislative 
procedure in which the Council acts unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.32 As in all the circumstances where the consent of the latter is necessary for an act 
to be adopted, the “two institutions invariably negotiate to agree a common text”;33 in the case 
of the EPPO, the Parliament has issued three resolutions in order to direct the negotiations of 
the Council, calling on it to implement some modifications of the text. Moreover, the 
Parliament is involved in other procedures that directly concern the EPPO, namely the adoption 
of the EU budget, which will finance the Office,34 and the adoption of the so-called ‘PIF 
Directive’, which will draw the boundaries of the material competence of the EPPO.35  
As far as unanimity in the Council is concerned, it refers to all EU member states with the 
exception of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland.36 However, there are very little chance 
for the Regulation to be adopted by unanimity. Some countries have taken a very critical stance 
during the negotiations (e.g. the Netherlands) and Sweden has already mentioned that it will 
                                                     
30 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (2002/584/JHA), OJ L190/1, 18.7.2002; Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L130/1, 
1.5.2014. On the European Investigation Order see more in section 7.  
31 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the national parliaments on 
the review of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2, COM(2013) 851 final, 27 
November 2013. For further reflections on the relations between the EPPO and the principle of subsidiarity see 
Fromage (2015), pp. 1-23; Sørensen and Elholm (2015), pp. 31-50; Wieczorek (2015), pp. 1247-1270; Mitsilegas 
(2016), pp. 40ff. 
32 Article 86(1) TFEU. 
33 Chalmers et al. (2014), p. 127. 
34 See Article 49(3)(a) draft Regulation.  
35 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), pp. 10-11. On the PIF Directive see more in the next section. 
36 At the time of writing, the UK has not yet notified its intention to withdraw from the Union pursuant to Article 
50 TEU. 
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not take part in the establishment of the EPPO.37 In the General Affairs Council meeting of 7 
February 2017, therefore, the Council formally registered the absence of unanimity.38  
Nevertheless, the same Article 86 TFEU provides leeway, which incidentally represents the only 
substantial difference between this provision and Article III-274 of the Constitution for Europe.  
According to Article 86(1) TFEU, if there is no unanimity within the Council, the draft Regulation 
can be referred to the European Council, if at least nine member states wish to proceed, and 
the procedure in the Council shall be suspended. Within four months of the suspension, if there 
is consensus in the European Council, the latter shall refer the draft back to the Council for 
adoption. Negotiations are currently at this stage, since the formal acknowledgment of the 
absence of unanimity in the Council “opens the way for a group of at least nine member states 
to refer the text for discussion to the European Council for a final attempt at securing consensus 
on the proposal”.39 
Otherwise, in case of disagreement, a group of at least nine member states may decide to 
establish enhanced cooperation to set up the EPPO: in light of the foregoing, this seems the 
only realistic way to establish the EPPO for the time being. After the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council meeting of December 2016, the French and German Ministries of Justice therefore 
issued a joint declaration calling for the creation of the EPPO even without the required 
unanimity and by means of enhanced cooperation.40  
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the procedure of enhanced 
cooperation has been used three times,41 but in the case of the EPPO a delicate political issue 
is brought to the fore. As underlined by Labayle, it seems contentious to establish an EU body 
aimed at protecting the EU interest par excellence but composed only by some EU member 
states.42 The need for as many member states as possible to take part in setting up the body 
was debated during the meeting of European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
                                                     
37 See the General approach of 31 January 2017 (Council doc. 5445/17, 31 January 2017). On the critical position 
of the Dutch Parliament and Government see Van der Hulst (2016), pp. 99-104. Also Poland and Hungary seem to 
be contrary to the adoption of the text: see www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-make-new-push-for-eu-
prosecutor/.   
38 See the press release of the General Affairs Council meeting of 7 February 2017, no. 48/17 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/2/47244654495_en.pdf). Already in the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council meeting of 8 and 9 December 2016, it was confirmed that not all of the 25 EU member states would 
have supported the establishment of the EPPO (see the outcome of the meeting, Council doc. 15391/16). 
39 Press release of the General Affairs Council meeting of 7 February 2017, cit. 
40 www.euractiv.fr/section/justice-affaires-interieures/news/le-couple-franco-allemand-tente-de-relancer-le-
parquet-europeen/?nl_ref=26727695. The above-mentioned press release of the General Affairs Council meeting 
of 7 February 2017 is indeed titled: “European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Council takes first step towards a 
possible enhanced cooperation”. 
41 See, among the others, Armstrong (2013); Drew (2015), pp. 21ff.  
42 Labayle (2010), pp. 59-60. For further reflections on the creation of the EPPO by means of enhanced 
cooperation, and on the pressing need to resort to such a procedure, see Fidelbo (2016), pp. 1-50. 
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and Home Affairs (LIBE) of 29 November 2016, where a representative of the Council made it 
clear that enhanced cooperation with fewer than 20 member states will hardly be accepted.43  
However, on a more practical level, the setting up of the Office by only some member states 
raises the question of how the relations of the EPPO with the non-participating states have to 
be regulated. The issue is dealt with in section 10 of this work, but at this stage it is to be noted 
that the likely non-participation of the Netherlands poses the further problem of the location 
of the EPPO. Because of the close relationship that the draft Regulation envisages between the 
EPPO and Eurojust,44 it would be logical that the EPPO shared the seat with Eurojust in The 
Hague. Also, the European Parliament has submitted that “it would be best for the EPPO and 
Eurojust to operate in the same location”.45 Nevertheless, a recital of the Commission’s 
proposal and of a previous version of the draft Regulation recalled the meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government held in Brussels on 13 December 2003. In that meeting, it was decided 
that, should the EPPO be established, its headquarters would be in Luxembourg. In the last 
version of the draft Regulation this recital has been removed from the text, since the matter 
has not been agreed yet. However, should the Netherlands not take part in the EPPO, it seems 
unlikely that the Office’s seat could be within the premises of Eurojust.  
5. Material competence of the EPPO 
Always conceived as a body aimed at the protection of the EU budget, the EPPO will be 
competent with regard to “criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union”.46 
However, some argued and still argue that the Office should be given other competences 
beyond the limited sphere of PIF offences. This has been sometimes envisaged also in the 
political debate, especially after the terrorist attacks in France in 2015 and in Belgium in 2016.47 
Article 86(4) TFEU states that the material competence of the EPPO could be broadened to 
include other forms of “serious crime having a cross-border dimension”, but this requires the 
unanimous decision of the European Council. For the moment, however, there is a clear will to 
limit the future powers of the EPPO to its traditional field of PIF offences, although the European 
Parliament has already shown its support for an EPPO dealing also with organised crime.48 
                                                     
43 The recording of the debate is available at www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20161129-0900-COMMITTEE-LIBE. 
44 See below, section 10.  
45 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 October 2016 on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Eurojust 
(2016/2750(RSP)), para. 10. See Weyembergh and Brière (2016), pp. 41-42.  
46 Article 4 draft Regulation.  
47 See for example the opinion expressed in April 2015 by the Leader of the ALDE group in the European Parliament 
and former Prime Minister of Belgium Verhofstadt (www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/guy-verhofstadt/terrorism-data-
surveillance_b_6654258.html), as well as the interview of November 2015 with the Italian Minister of Justice 
Orlando (www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/11/28/news/orlando_contro_i_terroristi_ma_senza_uno_stato_di_ 
polizia_niente_intercettazioni_per_tutti_cosi_si_tutela_la_nostra_libert-128324071/).  
48 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016 on the fight against corruption and follow-up of the CRIM 
resolution (2015/2110(INI)), para. 54. Klip argues that “it would be rather unwise to give the EPPO more 
competences than after the evaluation of its functioning during a significant certain period of time” (Klip, 2012, 
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However, the boundaries of the material competence of the EPPO will be set out by national 
laws. The draft Regulation does not define PIF offences but refers to a Directive to be adopted 
by the Council and the European Parliament, the so-called ‘PIF Directive’. The Commission tabled 
the proposal in July 201249 and eventually, after more than four years of negotiations, an 
agreement has been found. The formal adoption of the Directive should therefore be close.50 
The aim of the Directive is to harmonise national legislation concerning PIF offences, in order 
to overcome the existing differences which hamper an effective fight against these crimes. The 
PIF Directive and EPPO Regulation are therefore strictly intertwined, and the former has been 
considered the necessary prerequisite for the latter;51 as a consequence, the agreement on the 
Directive could facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations on the Regulation.  
However, the draft Directive has been criticised because it is expected to introduce a “very 
minimalistic degree of minimum harmonisation”,52 so that the European panorama of 
substantive criminal law will remain fragmented. This could seriously hamper the effectiveness 
of EPPO investigations and prosecutions.53 There could be cases, for instance, where a given 
behaviour is regarded as criminal only in some of the member states participating in the EPPO. 
Moreover, it has been long discussed whether VAT frauds should be included in the text of the 
Directive and, therefore, whether they should fall within the competence of the EPPO. The 
compromise found in the Council is that the most serious forms of such fraud have to be 
included in the Directive, namely VAT frauds which are connected with the territory of two or 
more member states and involve total damages of at least €10 million.54 The threshold was 
believed to be too high by the Commission and the Parliament,55 which would have preferred 
to lower it to €5 million, but the agreed text will probably not be altered.  
                                                     
pp. 370-371); after all, at the beginning Europol was competent only for drug crimes, whereas now its mandate 
covers many different areas of cross-border criminality (ibid.).  
49 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012) 363 final, 11 July 2012.  
50 “The Council confirmed a political agreement on a directive strengthening the protection of the EU’s financial 
interests, confirming a deal reached in December 2016 with the European Parliament. Political agreement means 
that the directive, in all official languages and resulting from the negotiations with the Parliament, has been 
endorsed at political level. It will now undergo legal-linguistic revision before formal adoption by the Council at 
first reading. This will be followed by final approval by the European Parliament at second reading” (Outcome of 
the Council meeting, General Affairs, 7 February 2017, p. 5, emphasis added).  
51 See the debate of the LIBE Committee of 29 November 2016, where this link between the EPPO Regulation and 
the Directive has been repeatedly underlined.  
52 Vervaele (2014), p. 97. For similar critical views on the PIF Directive see Sicurella (2016), pp. 109-137. 
53 See also Ligeti (2013), p. 82.   
54 Article 2(2) of the last version publicly available of the draft PIF Directive (Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law 
– political agreement, Council doc. 5478/17, 1 February 2017). Recital no. 4 of the Preamble to the draft PIF 
Directive clarifies that the notion of “total damage” refers “to the estimated damage, both for the financial 
interests of the Member States concerned and for the Union, which results from the entire fraud scheme”. 
55 See the debate of the LIBE Committee of 29 November 2016. 
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Moreover, the Office shall also be competent for the offence of participating in a criminal 
organisation, when the focus of such a criminal organisation is to commit any of the crimes 
affecting the financial interests of the EU provided in the aforementioned Directive. However, 
not only the concept of the ‘focus’ of the criminal activity is quite difficult to grasp; the draft 
Regulation also states that the participation in a criminal organisation has to be understood “as 
defined in Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, as implemented in national law”.56 This 
Framework Decision was meant to reduce the diversity of national legislation on organised 
crime, but it failed in reaching this goal; its impact on national legislation has been indeed very 
limited, as acknowledged by the Commission in its recent Report on the implementation of the 
Framework Decision.57  
The Regulation adds that the EPPO is competent for the crimes which are “inextricably linked”58 
to PIF offences. The text of the draft Regulation is silent on the meaning of this expression, 
whereas the Preamble clarifies that the notion of ‘inextricably linked offences’ should be 
considered “in light of the relevant case law which, for the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle, retains as a relevant criterion the identity of the material facts (or facts which are 
substantially the same), understood in the sense of the existence of a set of concrete 
circumstances which are inextricably linked together in time and space”.59 The regulation of 
this ancillary competence of the EPPO seems unsatisfactory for many reasons. 
First, an unambiguous definition of what is meant by ‘inextricably linked offences’ should be 
found in the draft Regulation itself, in order to reduce to the minimum the risks of a divergent 
interpretation of the same rule across the participating EU member states. Second, the 
reference to the case-law of the Court of Justice on the principle of ne bis in idem seems 
contentious. That jurisprudence is meant to lay down some criteria for the assessment of 
whether two sets of circumstances – for the purposes of the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle – have to be regarded as the same fact: if this is the case, a person cannot be judged 
twice for that same fact. On the contrary, ‘inextricably linked offences’ are by definition 
                                                     
56 Article 17(1a) draft Regulation. 
57 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council based on Article 10 of Council 
Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime’, COM(2016) 448 
final, 7 July 2016, p. 10. See also Mitsilegas (2011).  
58 Article 17(2) draft Regulation.  
59 Recital no. 49 of the Preamble to the draft Regulation. On this matter see, among the others, Nieto Martín and 
Muñoz de Morales Romero (2015), pp. 120-155. The first decision where the Court of Luxembourg dealt with the 
notion of ‘same facts’, for the purposes of application of Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement on ne bis in idem, was Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, 9 March 2006. The principle laid down therein, 
i.e. that the right to ne bis in idem applies with regard to a “set of facts which are inextricably linked together, 
irrespective of the legal classification given to them or the legal interest protected” (Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, 
cit., para. 42), has been confirmed in all the following judgements of the Court on the matter (see C-467/04, 
Gasparini and others, 28 September 2006, para. 54; Case C-150/05, Van Straaten, 28 September 2006, para. 48; 
Case C-288/05, Kretzinger, 18 July 2007, para. 29; Case C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, 18 July 2007, para. 26; for the 
application of this principle also in the frame of the procedures concerning the European Arrest Warrant see Case 
C-261/09, Mantello, 16 November 2010, para. 39). 
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different crimes than PIF offences, so that one can wonder how that case-law can help in 
identifying them.  
It can be reminded, in fact, that the previous version of the Preamble (i.e. that of the text under 
negotiations in December 2016) was much clearer on the matter, and it is regrettable that the 
EU legislator has changed its mind on the point. According to the previous version of Recital 
No. 49, “The notion of inextricably linked offences should be considered in light of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Such may be the case, for example, 
for offences which have been committed for the main purpose of creating the conditions to 
commit the offence affecting the financial interests of the Union, such as offences strictly aimed 
at ensuring the material or legal means to commit the offence affecting the financial interests 
of the Union, or to ensure the profit or product thereof”.60 The previous notion of ‘inextricably 
linked offences’ partially resembled that of ‘related criminal offences’ of the Regulation on 
Europol: since the latter notion is much clearer than the current recital on the ‘inextricably 
linked offences’ and is also in line with some rules already provided for by national legislation,61 
the option of using the same wording of the Regulation on Europol in the text of the draft EPPO 
Regulation could have been considered. 
In addition, it is to be noted that this further competence of the EPPO will be triggered only if 
– in principle – PIF offences are “preponderant”.62 This term was used in the Commission’s 
proposal,63 but it has been removed from the text of the Regulation and left to the Preamble. 
Article 20(3) of the draft Regulation lists the criteria according to which the PIF offence are 
considered ‘preponderant’ in respect of the ‘inextricably linked offences’. In principle, the 
Office can exercise its powers if the maximum penalty provided for PIF offences is greater than 
that for the inextricably linked offences.64 These penalties are determined by national 
legislators: once more, the remit of the EPPO will be significantly influenced by national 
legislation, with the risk that discrepancies among national systems can hamper the activities 
of the Office. 
                                                     
60 Recital no. 49 of the Preamble to the previous version of the draft Regulation (Proposal for a Regulation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Consolidated text, Council doc. 15200/16, 2 December 
2016).  
61 The crimes falling within the competence of Europol are listed in Annex I to the Regulation on Europol; in 
addition to them, Europol’s objectives shall also cover ‘related criminal offences’, i.e. criminal offences committed 
in order to: i) “procure the means of perpetrating acts in respect of which Europol is competent”; ii) “facilitate or 
perpetrate acts in respect of which Europol is competent”; iii) “ensure the impunity of those committing acts in 
respect of which Europol is competent” (Article 3(2) Regulation on Europol). This wording recalls, for example, 
that of Article 371(2) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates the cases where the investigations 
of different public prosecutor’s offices have to be coordinated. 
62 Recital no. 49b of the Preamble to the draft Regulation.  
63 Article 13 Commission’s proposal. 
64 Article 20(3)(a) draft Regulation. However, “with the consent of relevant national prosecution authorities” 
(Article 20(3a) draft Regulation), the EPPO can exercise its competence even when the PIF offence is punished 
with a lower penalty than the inextricably linked offence.  
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In short, the breadth of the competence of the EPPO is currently not very clear, although it will 
still rely to a considerable extent on national legal systems. This is confirmed by the fact that, 
should conflicts of jurisdiction arise between the EPPO and national prosecution authorities, 
national authorities will have the final word on whether a given crime falls within the mandate 
of the EPPO.65 The choice of placing the Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the hands of national bodies 
shows the inherent peculiarity of the Office: such an EU body, meant to fight EU fraud at the 
EU level, will be largely constrained by national laws and procedures. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that the European Parliament has criticised this provision, advocating a competence 
of an independent court, such as the Court of Justice.66 
Finally, it is to be noted that, in comparison with the Commission’s proposal, a shift from the 
exclusive competence of the EPPO on PIF offences to the shared competence between the 
Office and national authorities has occurred.67 This change confirms the will of limiting the 
powers of the EPPO and it implies that, on the one hand, the Office can evoke the case if 
investigations have already been opened at the national level and that, on the other hand, the 
EPPO can decide to refer the case back to national authorities according to the rules provided 
in the draft Regulation.68 In other words, “The articulation of shared competence between the 
EPPO and national authorities thus functions like an elevator going in both directions (up and 
down) in order to ensure that the case is handled at the most appropriate level, be it European 
or national”.69 
6. Structure and status of the Office 
The EPPO is organised into central and decentralised levels. The central Office is composed of 
the College, the Permanent Chambers, the European Chief Prosecutor, his(her) deputies, the 
European Prosecutors (EP), and the Administrative Director, whereas the European Delegated 
Prosecutors (EDPs) operate at the decentralised level.  
The EDPs are national prosecutors who are simultaneously members of the EPPO.70 As a 
consequence, when they are not dealing with crimes within the competence of the EPPO, they 
continue to carry out their ordinary tasks: this peculiar status is usually referred to as ‘double 
hat’, meaning that when EDPs wear the national hat they continue to be national prosecutors 
for all intents and purposes, whereas when they wear the European hat they have to follow 
instructions from the central Office. 
                                                     
65 Article 20(5) draft Regulation. The matter shall be dealt with by national authorities which are competent to 
decide on the attribution of competences concerning prosecution at national level.  
66 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 October 2016 on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Eurojust, 
cit., para. 3.  
67 See Article 11(4) Commission’s proposal and recital no. 7 of the Preamble to the draft Regulation. 
68 On the steps of the investigations of the EPPO, including the right to evocation, see more below, section 7.   
69 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 20 (emphasis added).  
70 Article 12 draft Regulation. 
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The EDPs play a central role in the EPPO: they carry out the investigations under the direction 
of the central Office and put in practice in their member state the decisions taken at the EU 
level by the Permanent Chambers.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the College is the management body of the Office and is 
composed of the European Chief Prosecutor and one European Prosecutor per member state. 
It has no operational powers in individual cases and it deals only with strategic matters and 
general issues.71 It adopts the budget of the Office and sets up the Permanent Chambers.72  
The Permanent Chambers shall have three members, the chair and two permanent members.73 
The internal rules of procedure, to be adopted by the College, will specify how many Chambers 
have to be established.74 The same internal rules “shall ensure an equal distribution of workload 
on the basis of a system of random allocation of cases and shall, in exceptional cases, provide 
for procedures allowing…for deviations from the principle of random allocation upon decision 
by the European Chief Prosecutor”.75 The Chambers are thought to be the beating heart of the 
EPPO, since they adopt the most relevant operational decisions of the Office, which need to be 
subsequently enacted by the European Delegated Prosecutors.  
However, the Regulation adds another layer between the Chambers and the EDPs, namely the 
supervising European Prosecutor, who supervises the activities of the EDPs and can give 
instructions to them in a specific case.76 (S)he is one of the European Prosecutors of the College, 
and more precisely the one from the same member state of the supervised European Delegated 
Prosecutor.77 Reasons of efficiency therefore underpin the peculiar role of the supervising 
European Prosecutors “as liaisons and channels of information between the Permanent 
Chambers and the European Delegated Prosecutors in their respective Member States of 
origin”:78 the legal systems of member states “still vary to a considerable degree, and it is clear 
that only a prosecutor with his or her background in a given legal system will be able to know 
exactly what actions are most appropriate and efficient in that given state”.79 Moreover, in the 
last version of the draft Regulation a further power has been attributed to the supervising 
European Prosecutor: where the national law provides that an act of a prosecutor can be 
                                                     
71 Article 8(2) draft Regulation.  
72 Respectively, Articles 48(1) and 8(3) draft Regulation.  
73 Article 9(1) draft Regulation. The chair of the Permanent Chamber is the European Chief Prosecutor, one of 
his/her deputies or a European Prosecutor appointed as a chair in accordance with the internal rules of procedure 
(ibid.).  
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. (emphasis added).  
76 Article 11(1) and (2) draft Regulation.  
77 Article 11(1) draft Regulation. 
78 Article 11(3) draft Regulation (emphasis added).  
79 Intervention of Ivan Korčok, President-in-Office of the Council during the debate of the European Parliament of 
4 October 2016, transcript available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference= 
20161004&secondRef=TOC&language=en (emphasis added).  
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reviewed within the structure of the public prosecutor’s office, the review of an act of an EDP 
shall be reviewed by the supervising European Prosecutor.80 
Is sum, a complex framework of powers and responsibilities emerges, defined as a structure 
with “too many chiefs and not enough Indians”.81 The figure below represents this complex 
framework. 
Figure 1. Structure of the EPPO 
 
Note: ECP: European Chief Prosecutor; DCP: Deputy Chief Prosecutor; EP: European Prosecutor; EDP: European Delegated 
Prosecutor. N.B.: pursuant to Article 11(1a) of the draft Regulation, the supervising EP can also be – in exceptional 
circumstances – from a different member state than the EDP. The number of the Permanent Chambers is to be decided by the 
internal rules of procedure. 
Source: The author. 
Serious concerns have been raised with regard to the collegial structure of the Office, since it 
seems unrealistic to expect that it will help the EPPO function efficiently.82 In addition, such a 
cumbersome structure mirrors that of Eurojust, which also features a College composed of one 
representative per member state. The difference lies in the fact that Eurojust’s College can 
exercise both operational and strategic powers; this has turned out to be a serious obstacle to 
its efficient functioning.83 However, the need to establish a brand new body with the same 
                                                     
80 Article 11(2a) draft Regulation.  
81  Csúri (2016), p. 24.  
82 The majority of authors have been strongly critical towards a collegial structure of the EPPO, even before the 
draft Regulation provided for it: see, among the many, Vervaele (2010), p. 193; Espina Ramos (2011), p. 40; Spiezia 
(2013), p. 558; Damaskou (2015), p. 146. Among those who support the collegial model of the EPPO, see 
Ostropolski (2016), pp. 71-72. The Commission’s proposal put forward a blatantly less cumbersome structure: the 
Office was thought to be composed only of the European Chief Prosecutor, his(her) deputies and the EDPs. 
However, this choice was not welcomed by some member states and during the Greek presidency (2014) the 
original text was considerably altered by introducing the above-mentioned additional layers. 
83 See, among the many, Jeney (2012), pp. 37ff. 
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structure and composition of an existing one is quite difficult to justify, especially in light of the 
current limited powers of the EPPO, which looks like a “reinforced Eurojust”84 rather than a real 
EU Prosecutor.  
Moreover, other concerns arise with regard to the supervising European Prosecutors. For 
example, even though the EDPs shall follow directions and instructions of the Permanent 
Chamber, as well as the instructions of the supervising EP,85 there are no mechanisms to solve 
the possible conflicts among the two tiers of the central Office. What if the supervising EP and 
the Chamber have different views on the same matter? Whereas the EDP failing to follow the 
instructions of the Chamber or of the European Prosecutor can be ‘punished’ by reallocating 
his(her) case to another EDP in the same member state,86 nothing is advised in case of conflict 
between the Permanent Chamber and the supervising European Prosecutor.  
The real question to address is whether the position of the Chamber should prevail, in light of 
its role in the EPPO, or whether the final word should be that of the supervising EP since (s)he 
is definitely more acquainted with the legal system in which the investigations are carried out. 
The draft Regulation suggests that the power to adopt key decisions is bestowed upon the 
Chambers, which could therefore ignore the different stance of the supervising EP. After all, it 
seems that the latter shall not even be part of the Permanent Chamber to which the case is 
assigned, as the wording of Article 9(6) draft Regulation suggests: “In addition to the permanent 
Members, the European Prosecutor who is supervising an investigation or a prosecution…shall 
participate in the deliberations of the Permanent Chamber”.87 The supervising European 
Prosecutor has the right to vote, except for some decisions listed in the same Article 9(6) of the 
draft Regulation. 
Practical problems of uneven distribution of workload could also arise, since some European 
Prosecutors will most probably be called to supervise a greater number of investigations than 
others. Therefore, the last version of the draft Regulation has introduced a derogation from the 
national link: “A European Prosecutor may request, in an exceptional manner, on grounds 
related to the workload resulting from the number of investigations and prosecutions in his/her 
Member State of origin, or a conflict of interest concerning him or her, that the supervision of 
investigations and prosecutions of individual cases handled by European Delegated Prosecutors 
in his/her Member State of origin be assigned to other European Prosecutors, subject to their 
agreement of the latter”.88 The decision thereof has to be taken by the European Chief 
Prosecutor.  
                                                     
84 Caianiello (2013), pp. 123-124. 
85 Article 12(1) draft Regulation. See also Article 11(2) draft Regulation, which provides that the supervising 
European Prosecutor may give instructions to the European Delegated Prosecutor in a specific case, “in 
compliance with the instruction given by the competent Permanent Chamber”.  
86 Article 23(3)(b) draft Regulation. 
87 Article 9(6) draft Regulation (emphasis added). 
88 Article 11(1a) draft Regulation (emphasis added).  
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The choice of allowing a derogation from the national link preserves the independence of the 
Office but risks undermining its efficiency: in the simplest scenario, investigations carried out 
in member state A will be supervised by a European Prosecutor coming from member state B, 
under the direction of a Chamber composed of prosecutors of member states C, D and E. 
Supervision will be carried out by persons who are not experts of the legal system where the 
investigations – and in principle the trial – take place, and who realistically do not even speak 
the language of the proceedings (at least in the majority of cases). 
The complex internal hierarchy of the EPPO is coupled with the external independence of the 
Office, enshrined in Article 6 of the draft Regulation. As a consequence, the members of the 
EPPO should not take instructions from persons external to the Office itself, from EU bodies or 
from member states.89 The EPPO shall be accountable to the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament, which have therefore the power to apply to the Court of Justice with a 
view to the removal of the European Chief Prosecutor and of the European Prosecutors under 
certain circumstances.90 The EPPO shall also transmit to each of these institutions, as well as to 
the national parliaments, an annual report.91 The experience of Eurojust shows that such a 
report is an instrument with very limited practical relevance, since “the work and performance 
of Eurojust only formally reaches the political levels of the Council and substantive evaluation 
or political debate on this topic is not held”.92 In addition, the European Chief Prosecutor shall 
appear once a year before the European Parliament and before the Council, and before 
national parliaments at their request, to give an account of the general activities of the EPPO.93  
Therefore, notwithstanding the relevant embedding of the EPPO in national systems, its 
accountability has been lifted at the European level. Such a decision, as well as that on the 
independence of the Office, has raised concerns in those countries where the prosecution 
authorities are hierarchically subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, which is in turn accountable 
for their activities (such as in the Netherlands).94 Nevertheless, the need for an independent 
EPPO has been voiced by many authors and supported by the European Parliament,95 not least 
because the independence of the Office – especially from national authorities – could lead 
                                                     
89 Article 6(1) draft Regulation.   
90 Respectively, Articles 13(4) and 14(5) draft Regulation.  
91 See Article 6a(1) draft Regulation.  
92 Jeney (2012), p. 40 (emphasis added). The author explains that the conclusions adopted by the Council on 
Eurojust’s annual report are actually adopted without discussion at the political level, since the draft is discussed 
in the working parties COPEN and CATS and then agreed by the COREPER II as an A item, i.e. without deliberation 
(ibid., p. 39).  
93 Article 6a(2) draft Regulation. 
94 The strongly critical Dutch position on the matter has been summed up as it follows: “There should be 
accountability at the Member State level for the actions and results of investigation, prosecution, and sentencing 
of criminal activities. It is considered unacceptable that democratic control over the EPPO is foreseen in an annual 
report that only will be presented to the European Parliament, whereas the actual investigation and prosecution 
would take place in the Member States” (Van der Hulst, 2016, p. 100; see also Geelhoed, 2016, pp. 94ff.).  
95 See, among the many, Espina Ramos (2011), p. 42; Lohse (2015), p. 169. For further considerations on the 
independence of the EPPO see Symeonidou-Kastanidou (2015), pp. 255-278.  
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solving problems related to the low priority that PIF offences usually have among the national 
public prosecutor’s offices.96  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the role of national parliaments with regard to the 
accountability of the EPPO is much less relevant than that envisaged in the current Regulation on 
Europol, whose Article 51 deals with the so-called ‘Joint Parliamentary scrutiny’. Pursuant to 
the latter provision, the scrutiny on the activities of the agency shall be carried out by the Joint 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG), established together by the national parliaments and the 
competent committee of the European Parliament. Debates on how the JPSG shall function 
and work are ongoing at the time of writing.97 In line with the advocated independence of the 
EPPO, it is not surprising that a similar regime of accountability has not been replicated in the 
draft Regulation. On the contrary, the role of national parliaments is limited to receiving the 
annual report of the Office and to requesting the European Chief Prosecutor to appear before 
them to give an account of the general activities of the EPPO.  
A similar difference between the Office and Europol was already provided for by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which regulates in a different way the regimes of accountability for the EPPO on the 
one hand, and for Eurojust and Europol on the other. Whereas Article 86 TFEU is silent on the 
issue, Articles 85 (on Eurojust) and 88 (on Europol) TFEU provide that the regulations 
concerning these agencies shall lay down the procedures for the evaluation and scrutiny of 
their activities by the European Parliament and the national parliaments.  
7. Investigations  
The following bullet points intend to summarise the most relevant steps of the investigations 
of the EPPO.  
1.  Initiation of the investigation and choice of the competent member state. The decision to 
initiate the investigation is adopted – without undue delay98 – by the European Delegated 
Prosecutor; however, in case of inactivity of the EDP, the competent Permanent Chamber 
instructs the EDP to initiate the investigation.99 The competent EDP is the one from the 
member state where “the focus of the criminal activity is or, if several connected offences 
within the competences of the Office have been committed, the Member State where the 
bulk of the offences has been committed”.100 
1a. Right of evocation. When the investigation has already been initiated by national 
authorities in a member state, the EDP from that member state can evoke the case; 
                                                     
96 Bachmaier Winter (2015), pp. 128-129. 
97 See more in the Draft Proposal of Troika Working Group on Europol Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for the 
LIBE Inter-Parliamentary Committee Meeting, 28 November 2016, available at 
www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/05eb6a1b-2a40-40bf-9e76-
7fdb9a71c35d/Troika_Working_Group_Proposal_for_LIBE_ICM.pdf.  
98 Article 5(5) draft Regulation.  
99 Article 22(3) draft Regulation. 
100 Article 22(4) draft Regulation (emphasis added). 
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however, if the EDP does not consider it necessary to exercise the right of evocation, 
(s)he shall inform the Permanent Chamber, which can instruct the EDP to evoke the 
case.101  
1b. Reallocation of the case. Until the end of the investigation, the Permanent Chamber can 
decide to allocate the case to the EDP of another member state, if this is in the general 
interest of justice, taking due account of the current state of the investigation; such a 
decision is to be taken “after consultation with the European Prosecutors and/or 
European Delegated Prosecutors concerned”102 and on the basis of the criteria listed in 
the draft Regulation.103 
 The choice of the member state where the investigation has to be carried out is of 
fundamental importance both for the prosecution and for the defence: since the EPPO 
mostly relies on national law, the parties to the proceedings have the powers and the 
rights provided for by that system. In principle, the ensuing trial shall take place in that 
same member state.104 Nevertheless, such a choice is not subject to any judicial review 
at the EU level. In addition, the territorial competence of the EPPO is identified by means 
of quite vague notions, such as ‘focus of the activity’ and ‘bulk of the offences’, which 
do not sit squarely with the necessary legal certainty which should underpin the 
activities of the EPPO. 
2. Conducting the investigations. Investigations are conducted by the EDP who is competent 
on the basis of the above-mentioned rules, under the direction of the Permanent Chamber 
and the supervision of the competent European Prosecutor. However, there are two 
exceptions to this rule: 
- the case can be allocated to another European Delegated Prosecutor in the same 
member state, if the competent EDP cannot perform the investigations or does not 
follow the instructions of the Chamber or of the European Prosecutor;105  
- in the most serious cases, the supervising European Prosecutor can decide to 
conduct the investigations himself(herself).106  
The EDP can order the investigative measures which are available to prosecutors under 
national law in similar national cases.107 In addition, member states shall ensure that 
the EDPs can request some investigative measures expressly listed in Article 25(1) of 
the draft Regulation (such as searching premises or intercepting electronic 
communications), at least in cases where the offence under investigation is punishable 
                                                     
101 Article 9(3a)(b) draft Regulation. 
102 Article 22(5)(a) draft Regulation. 
103 See Article 22(4) and (5) draft Regulation. 
104 See Article 30(2) draft Regulation. 
105 Article 23(3) draft Regulation. 
106 Article 23(4) draft Regulation. This provision shall not apply in those cases where a derogation from the national 
link has been authorised pursuant to Article 11(1a) draft Regulation, i.e. when the supervising Prosecutor and the 
EDP are from different member states (see above, section 6).  
107 Article 25(2) draft Regulation.  
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by a maximum penalty of at least four years of imprisonment.108 The procedures and 
the modalities for taking the measures shall be governed by national law, but the draft 
Regulation introduces further requirements, since all the measures  may be ordered 
only where “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the specific measure in 
question might provide information or evidence useful to the investigation, and where 
there is no less intrusive measure available which could achieve the same objective”.109  
In any case, the costs of the measures to be adopted have to be paid by national 
authorities, unless an exceptionally costly investigative measure is necessary. In similar 
circumstances, the European Delegated Prosecutors may consult the Permanent 
Chamber on whether the cost of the investigative measure could partly be met by the 
EPPO.110 
3. Cross-border investigations. In cross-border cases, the general rule is that the EDP handling 
the case (HEDP) assigns the execution of an investigative measure to the EDP of the member 
state in which the measure needs to be executed (the ‘assisting EDP’). In some 
circumstances (such as when the assignment is incomplete or when the requested 
measure does not exist under national law), the assisting EDP has to inform his supervising 
European prosecutor and the EDP handling the case in order to solve the problem 
bilaterally. If they cannot agree, the Permanent Chamber is called in to decide whether and 
by when the assigned or another measure shall be undertaken by the assisting EDP.111  
4. Pre-trial arrest. If the EDP has to arrest someone in his(her) member state, (s)he applies 
national law. If the person is located in another member state, the EDP shall issue a 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW).112  
 
The distribution of tasks during the investigations of the EPPO is represented by the following 
table.113 
                                                     
108 Article 25(1) draft Regulation.  
109 Article 25(3) draft Regulation.  
110 Article 49(5a) draft Regulation.  
111 Article 26 draft Regulation. 
112 Article 28 draft Regulation. 
113 The table also includes a reference to the procedures for lifting privileges or immunities, provided for by Article 
24 draft Regulation. Since the matter is quite sensitive, this is the only moment in which the European Chief 
Prosecutor intervenes during the investigations. 
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Figure 2. Investigations of the EPPO 
 
Source: The author. 
 
The table confirms that the EDPs will be the kingpins of the investigations of the EPPO, which 
will be mostly carried out pursuant to national law. The intervention of the Permanent 
Chambers is mainly limited to ‘crisis situations’: if the EDP has not decided to do so, they 
instruct him(her) to initiate the investigations or to evoke the case; if the EDP does not follow 
the instructions of the central Office, they can reallocate the case; if there is not an agreement 
on the measures to be adopted in cross-border cases, they decide on the issue. Such a scenario 
is problematic. Because of the lack of a corpus of European procedural rules and of the – almost 
entirely – national regulation of the investigations of the EPPO, once the EDP has decided (not) 
to do something, why should his(her) decision be overturned by the Permanent Chamber? For 
instance, in the case where the EDP decides not to open an investigation “in accordance with 
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the applicable national law” (Article 22(1), draft Regulation), how could the Permanent 
Chamber – which is composed by prosecutors from other member states – instruct the EDP to 
initiate it? The investigation should be launched in accordance with that same national law 
which led the EDP not to open that investigation. Further complications could occur if the 
supervising EP shares the view of the EDP handling the case and not that of the Permanent 
Chamber. 
In other words, disjointing the level of regulation of the activities of the EPPO (mainly national 
law) and the level on which decisions are taken (Permanent Chambers) could lead to a complex 
catch-22. It is true that the main goal of the EPPO is to guarantee homogenous and effective 
investigations and prosecutions against PIF offences all over Europe, but can this goal be truly 
reached if the nuts and bolts of the procedure remain national and only limited moments – 
namely the decisional ones – are in the hands of the central level of the Office? Is it acceptable 
to upgrade on the European plane just the power to take relevant decisions, when the grounds, 
requirements and procedures for those decisions are established mainly by national law? 
The current regulation of the proceedings of the EPPO becomes even less tenable in light of a 
further element, namely the choice to give up on the concept of ‘single legal area’. In the 
Commission’s proposal it was stated that the territory of the EU member states has to be 
considered a “single legal area”114 for the purposes of EPPO investigations and prosecutions. 
This concept was already put forward in the Corpus Juris and in the so-called ‘Model Rules’.115 
The consequence of a single legal area is that the EPPO should work as a unique prosecution 
authority throughout the EU and that it should be able to give orders and directions to the 
members of its Office without the need to resort to the instruments of mutual recognition.116 
The concept of a single legal area is precisely meant to leave behind the dynamics of mutual 
recognition, which are on the contrary central in the current system of judicial cooperation at 
the EU level.  
As a consequence of the ‘single legal area’ and with regard to cross-border investigations, the 
Commission’s proposal provided that the European Delegated Prosecutor who conducts the 
investigations has to “act in close consultation”117 with the EDP of the other member state 
where an investigative measure has to be carried out. Thus a close consultation between the 
EDPs should have been sufficient to lead to the adoption of investigative measures in different 
member states, as it should be normal in the frame of a single office working in a single legal 
area. As far as the pre-trial arrest is concerned, it was likewise stated that the EPPO “may 
request from the competent judicial authority the arrest or pre-trial detention of the suspected 
                                                     
114 Article 25(1) Commission’s proposal.  
115 In the framework of a project conducted at the University of Luxembourg, a group of experts published a corpus 
of 67 detailed rules for the future functioning of the EPPO, the so-called ‘Model Rules for the procedure of the 
EPPO’ (‘Model Rules’). See more at www.eppo-project.eu/. On the ‘single legal area’, see Article 18(1) Corpus Juris 
2000 and Rule 2 of the Model Rules. 
116 Kostoris (2013), pp. 392-393. 
117 Article 18(2) Commission’s proposal. 
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person in accordance with national law”.118 The order to arrest, therefore, would have come 
from the EPPO, even though national law would have applied as usual. 
However, as seen above, both cross-border investigations and pre-trial arrest in the framework 
of EPPO activities are now regulated in a completely different way, namely one which replicates 
to a large extent the rationale of the existing mutual recognition instruments. This is self-
evident in the case of pre-trial arrest, where the use of the EAW is expressly envisaged.  
The rules on cross-border investigations are more complicated. The matter could have been 
regulated by a reference to the recent Directive on the European Investigation Order (EIO). The 
EIO is a judicial decision issued by national judicial authorities of a member state (‘issuing 
authority’) to have one or more specific investigative measure(s) carried out in another 
member state, with the aim to obtain evidence. As with the EAW, in practical terms the EIO is 
a form to be completed by a national competent authority who will send it to the executing 
state where the needed evidence can be found. The executing authority shall recognise an EIO 
without any further formality being required.  
During the negotiations, “an alignment of the EPPO provision with those of the EIO 
was…rejected in favour of a sui generis regime for the EPPO. Relying on mutual recognition was 
rightly considered as completely deviating from the idea that the EPPO is a single European 
body acting across EU MSs”.119 However, looking at the rules of the draft Regulation concerning 
cross-border investigations, the logic of mutual recognition does not seem to have been 
completely left behind.  
For example, the EIO Directive provides for the possibility of the executing authority to have 
recourse to an investigative measure other than that requested by the issuing authority, 
“where the investigative measure selected by the executing authority would achieve the same 
result by less intrusive means than the investigative measure indicated in the EIO”.120 
Something similar is to be found in the draft EPPO Regulation. When the assisting EDP considers 
that “an alternative but less intrusive measure would achieve the same results as the measure 
assigned”,121 (s)he shall inform the supervising European Prosecutor and consult with the EDP 
handling the case. If the matter cannot be resolved bilaterally by the EDPs within seven working 
days, it is deferred to the Permanent Chamber, which shall decide “whether and by when the 
assigned measure needed, or a substitute measure, shall be undertaken by the assisting 
European Delegated Prosecutor”.122  
                                                     
118 Article 26(7) Commission’s proposal. 
119 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), pp. 31-32.  
120 Article 10(3) EIO Directive.  
121 Article 26(5)(c) draft Regulation.  
122 Article 26(7) draft Regulation.  
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Likewise, a similar procedure can be triggered in other cases mentioned in the draft Regulation. 
123 It is true that Article 11 of the EIO Directive lists a number of grounds for non-recognition or 
non-execution of the EIO which are not provided in the draft EPPO Regulation. However, on 
the one hand, the procedure just mentioned – attempt to solve the case bilaterally and further 
possible deferral of the matter to the Permanent Chamber – suggests that there will be cases 
in which the assisting EDP basically refuses the prompt execution of the measure assigned by 
the EDP handling the case. Moreover, this procedure recalls that provided for by the EIO 
Directive in most of the cases where the executing authority intends not to execute the EIO.124 
On the other hand, as noted by Weyembergh & Brière, since the measure to be adopted in the 
member state of the assisting EDP could need a judicial authorisation (see immediately below), 
the “question thus remains whether…the judicial authority in the assisting MS will be able to 
deny the authorisation of the measure on broader grounds than those foreseen in the EIO 
Directive”.125 
As far as the judicial authorisation of the investigative measures is concerned, in fact, the EPPO 
Regulation does not provide for any simplification. If the authorisation is required in the 
assisting member state, it has to be duly obtained; if it is refused by the competent authority, 
the EDP handling the case shall withdraw the assignment. If the authorisation is not needed in 
the assisting state but is required in that of the EDP handling the case, it must be obtained as 
well and must be submitted together with the assignment.126  
The regulation of the EIO Directive does not look significantly different. Since the issuing 
authority may only issue an EIO when the investigative measure(s) indicated in the EIO could 
have been ordered under the same conditions in a similar domestic case,127 it is to be argued 
that if a judicial authorisation would be needed in similar national cases it shall be likewise 
necessary for the measure requested with the EIO. Once the executing authority receives the 
EIO, unless there are grounds for non-recognition or non-execution, the EIO shall be executed 
without any further formality being required. This should imply that no judicial authorisation 
would be necessary in the executing member state, even though the text of the EIO Directive 
is somehow ambiguous when it defines the notion of ‘executing authority’: this term refers to 
“an authority having competence to recognise an EIO and ensure its execution in accordance 
                                                     
123 Apart from that already mentioned, the other cases where the procedure recalled in the text is triggered occur 
when “the assisting European Delegated Prosecutor considers that: (a) the assignment is incomplete or contains 
a manifest relevant error; (b) the measure cannot be undertaken within the time limit set out in the assignment 
for justified and objective reasons; […] or (d) the assigned measure does not exist or would not be available in a 
similar domestic case under the law of his or her Member State” (Article 26(5) draft Regulation).  
124 “In the cases referred to in points (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) of paragraph 1 [i.e. the paragraph listing all the ground 
for non-execution or non-recognition of the EIO] before deciding not to recognise or not to execute an EIO, either 
in whole or in part the executing authority shall consult the issuing authority, by any appropriate means, and shall, 
where appropriate, request the issuing authority to supply any necessary information without delay” (Article 11(4) 
EIO Directive, emphasis added). 
125 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 32 (emphasis added). 
126 Article 26(3) draft Regulation. 
127 Article 6(1)(b) EIO Directive. 
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with [the EIO] Directive and the procedures applicable in a similar domestic case. Such 
procedures may require a court authorisation in the executing State where provided by its 
national law”.128 
The main similarities between the EIO Directive and the rules on cross-border investigations in 
the current draft Regulation are represented in the table below, where the provision of the 
Commission’s proposal is also included. 
Figure 3. Cross-border investigations in the framework of the EPPO vs. EIO Directive 
 
Note: EDP: European Delegated Prosecutor; EIO: European Investigation Order; EP: European Prosecutor; executing authority: 
the authority having competence to recognise an EIO and to ensure its execution in accordance with the EIO Directive and the 
procedures applicable in a similar domestic case; HEDP: European Delegated Prosecutor handling the case; issuing authority: a 
judge, a court, an investigating judge or a public prosecutor issuing the EIO; MS: member state. 
1 Article 9 of the EIO Directive provides that the executing authority shall recognise an EIO without any further formality being 
required, but Article 2(d) Directive defines the ‘executing authority’ as “an authority having competence to recognise an EIO 
and ensure its execution in accordance with [the EIO] Directive and the procedures applicable in a similar domestic case. Such 
procedures may require a court authorisation in the executing State where provided by its national law”.  
Source: The author. 
 
In light of the foregoing, the current regulation of the EPPO’s investigations does not seem to 
significantly depart from the current scenario of judicial cooperation at the EU level, and it is not 
                                                     
128 Article 2(d) EIO Directive (emphasis added).   
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clear why the negotiations have not led to design “an EPPO specific mechanism”129 for cross-
border investigations and pre-trial arrest. 
8. Prosecution 
Once the investigations are over, the decision to prosecute or dismiss the case is taken with the 
procedure summarised below.  
Figure 4. Termination of the investigation 
 
Source: The author. 
 
When the EDP handling the case considers the investigations complete, (s)he submits a report 
to the supervising European Prosecutor. The report contains both a summary of the case and a 
draft decision on what is deemed to be appropriate (dismiss a case or bring it to prosecution, 
etc.). Next, the supervising European Prosecutor has to forward these documents to the 
competent Permanent Chamber, if necessary accompanied by his(her) own assessment. In 
principle, the Chamber is not bound either by the draft decision of the HEDP or by the 
assessment of the supervising European Prosecutor, since it can undertake its own review of 
the case before taking a final decision or giving further instructions to the EDP.130  
The most recent versions of the draft Regulation have introduced some relevant changes in 
that regard. A silent procedure has been introduced: if the EDP suggests bringing a case to 
                                                     
129 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), pp. 32-33. 
130 See Article 29(1) and (2) draft Regulation.  
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judgment and the Permanent Chamber does not take any decision within 21 days, the decision 
proposed by the EDP shall be deemed to have been accepted.131 However, if the EDP is of the 
opinion that a prosecution shall be launched, the Permanent Chamber cannot decide to dismiss 
a case,132 it can only “postpone it, e.g. by asking for further evidence”.133 
In principle, the competent member state is that of the EDP handling the case. However, the 
Permanent Chamber can decide that it is more appropriate for the prosecution to be launched 
in another member state, on the basis of the same criteria to be taken into account when 
identifying the EDP competent to carry out the investigations.134 The issue of the choice of 
forum is one of the most debated, since at the EU level there are no binding rules on conflicts 
of jurisdiction. Already at the time of the Corpus Juris, Christine Van den Wyngaert suggested 
that this choice should have been revised by a European pre-trial chamber;135 likewise, the 
Model Rules provide that the choice of forum may be subject to an appeal to be decided at the 
EU level.136 However, the draft Regulation only states that the competent forum is chosen by 
the Permanent Chamber, without any form of judicial control at the EU level, notwithstanding 
the strong criticism of many authors and experts.137 
The decision of the Permanent Chamber could also lead to the dismissal of the case, namely in 
cases of: death or insanity of the suspect or accused person, amnesty or immunity granted to 
him(her) (unless the immunity has been lifted), winding up of the suspect or accused legal 
person, expiry of the national statutory limitation to prosecute, ne bis in idem, and lack of 
relevant evidence.138 The Regulation makes clear that such a decision of the Chamber has to 
be adopted when the prosecution has become impossible “pursuant to the law of the Member 
State” 139 of the EDP handling the case. This implies that all the grounds for refusal have to be 
interpreted according to national law. When the death or the insanity of the suspect or accused 
person is brought to the fore, as well as the winding up of the suspect or accused legal person, 
it is obvious that the prosecution becomes impossible and that the Permanent Chamber has to 
dismiss the case; the differences among legal systems should not be relevant. On the contrary, 
                                                     
131 Article 30(1a) draft Regulation.  
132 Article 30(1) draft Regulation. 
133 Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Policy debate, 
Council doc. 15057/16, 5 December 2016, p. 4.  
134 Article 30(2) draft Regulation. 
135 Van den Wyngaert (2004), pp. 238-239. 
136 Rule 64 of the Model Rules.  
137 For similar views on the need of an EU scrutiny on the choice of forum see, among the many, Vervaele (2010), 
p. 192; Lohse (2015), p. 181; Meijers Committee (2016), pp. 1-2. Wasmeier argues that a scrutiny at the national 
level could be sufficient, if national courts can rely on “an appropriate ‘yardstick’. This can only be a legal 
framework on Union level; without it, national courts will hardly be in the position to review a multilateral choice 
of forum” (Wasmeier, 2015, p. 154). As mentioned, for the time being there is no EU legislation setting out binding 
criteria to solve conflicts of jurisdiction.  
138 Article 33(1) draft Regulation.  
139 Ibid. (emphasis added).  
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in all the other circumstances, the lack of a homogenous substantive criminal law can be a 
serious obstacle for the effectiveness of the EPPO.  
For example, the case has to be dismissed in case of “expiry of the national statutory limitation 
to prosecute”.140 However, the regime of statutory limitation varies significantly among the 
member states, so that it could happen that the European prosecutions have to be dropped 
just because one of the member states regulates its limitation periods in an unsatisfactory way. 
The issue is not merely speculative, as the recent Taricco case shows.141 In this decision, the 
Court of Justice ruled that the at the time Italian regime on the statute of limitation of VAT 
frauds was “liable to have an adverse effect on the fulfilment of the Member States’ obligations 
under Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU if that national rule prevents the imposition of effective and 
dissuasive penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the European Union, or provides for longer limitation periods in respect of cases of 
fraud affecting the financial interests of the Member State concerned than in respect of those 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union”.142 This judgment shows how pressing 
can be the need of a common substantive criminal law regime for the EPPO, including a 
common regulation of the statutes of limitation. 
Finally, apart from the referral of the case to the national authorities when the crime does not 
fall within the competence of the EPPO or when the case is minor,143 the Chamber can also 
decide to apply a simplified prosecution procedure, upon proposal of the HEDP.144 The 
Commission’s proposal regulated the transaction between the EPPO and the defendant,145 
whereas the current text does not set out a common procedure at the EU level and it refers to 
the applicable national law: therefore, the simplified procedures are allowed only if they 
already feature in domestic criminal justice systems. To sum up, the distribution of tasks in the 
phase following the investigations can be represented as follows:146 
                                                     
140 Article 33(1)(d) draft Regulation.  
141 Case C-105/14, Taricco and others, 8 September 2015. On this judgment see, among others, Billis (2016), pp. 
20-38; Caianiello (2016), pp. 1-17; Giuffrida (2016), pp. 100-112. The Taricco case triggered the reopening of the 
negotiations on the possible inclusion of VAT frauds in the scope of the PIF Directive (see section 5).  
142 Case C-105/14, Taricco and others, cit., para. 58. 
143 See Article 28a draft Regulation. 
144 Article 34 draft Regulation. 
145 Article 29 Commission’s proposal.  
146 The table also includes acts that have not been discussed in text, such as the reopening of the investigations 
(Article 33(2) draft Regulation) and the appeal against judgments of national courts (Article 30(6) draft Regulation). 
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Figure 5. Prosecutions of the EPPO. 
 
Source: The author.  
The difference between the table above and the one concerning the investigative phase is 
straightforward. Once the investigations are closed, the key decisions of the proceedings are all 
taken by the Permanent Chambers, with the relevant exception of the decision to bring a case 
to judgment, which the Chamber cannot but rubber-stamp.  
Therefore, the true ‘European moment’ of the activities of the EPPO is the one in between the 
investigations, mostly regulated by national law, and the trial, entirely regulated by national 
law. Since this ‘European moment’ is strongly constrained by domestic laws and regulated at 
the EU level only by a handful of rules, one can wonder whether the Permanent Chambers will 
actually be able to impose their views on the EDP handling the case or whether they will (or 
should) follow the decisions and suggestions of the latter, who is much more acquainted with 
the national system in which the investigations and the trial take place.147  
If the Permanent Chambers will not be able to contradict the EDPs, then the whole sense of 
establishing the EPPO is difficult to grasp. On the other hand, if they do prevail on contrary 
                                                     
147 As mentioned, the last version of the draft Regulation has partially faced this problem with regard to the 
decision to bring a case to judgment by significantly reducing the discretion of the Permanent Chambers. 
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decisions of the EDPs, their victory risks being a pyrrhic one, since the proceedings shall follow 
domestic rules and the Chambers would have little to say on that. In addition, it is true that 
they can reallocate the case to another EDP of the same member state when the EDP handling 
the case fails to follow the instructions of the Chamber,148 but it is also true that if the decision 
of the EDP is justified on grounds of law it is questionable whether the change of the EDP will 
actually lead to the adoption of a different decision. The gap between the level where the 
decisions are made (EU level/Permanent Chamber) and the level where actions have to be 
taken (national level/EDPs) could lead – once more – to very problematic situations, or even 
paralyse the body.  
Finally, in the framework of the rules on prosecution, the rule on evidence needs to be 
mentioned. Article 31 of the draft Regulation is quite synthetic. On the one hand, as with the 
Commission’s proposal, it confirms that the Regulation does not prevent trial courts from freely 
assessing the evidence presented by the EPPO or by the defendant. On the other hand, it 
introduces a ‘negative rule’ on the admission of evidence, stating that evidence presented by 
the EPPO or the defendant “shall not be denied admission on the mere ground that the 
evidence was gathered in another Member State or in accordance with the law of another 
Member State”.149 In other words, national rules will apply with the only limitation that 
evidence cannot be excluded just because of its foreign provenance. In light of the currently 
envisaged functioning of the EPPO and of the lack of any homogenous EU corpus of rules 
concerning evidence, such a provision seems reasonable, apart from the usual caveat that a 
system which mostly replicates the current one does not seem to have a blatant added value.  
Certainly, this provision looks less contentious than the previous version of Article 31, which 
added that “[w]here the law of the Member State of the trial Court requires that the latter 
examines the admissibility of evidence, it shall ensure it is satisfied that its admission would not 
be incompatible with Member States obligations to respect the fairness of the procedure, the 
rights of defence, or other rights as enshrined in the Charter, in accordance with Article 6 
TEU”.150 A similar provision seemed to suggest that such scrutiny of national authorities had to 
be carried out only if national law requires a check on the admissibility of evidence and on the 
basis of excessively vague concepts (‘fairness of the procedure’, ‘rights of defence’, etc.). Risks 
of “legal uncertainty”151 were evident. The current regulation of the matter does not guarantee 
that the circulation of evidence in the framework of the activities of the EPPO will be 
straightforward and unproblematic, but at least it does not place any further – admittedly 
obscure – obligation on national authorities. 
                                                     
148 Article 23(3) draft Regulation.  
149 Article 31(1) draft Regulation. 
150 Article 31(1) draft Regulation in the version of 12 October 2016 (Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment 
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Completed text, Council doc. 12774/2/16, 12 October 2016).   
151 Helenius (2015), p. 201. 
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9. Procedural safeguards 
Under the title ‘procedural safeguards’, the draft Regulation contains rules concerning two 
extremely debated issues, namely the protection of the rights of the suspects and accused 
persons and the judicial review of the acts of the EPPO.  
9.1 Rights of the suspects and accused persons 
As far as the rights of the defendant are concerned, Article 35 of the draft Regulation provides 
three different levels of protection.152 First, suspects and accused persons shall have the 
procedural rights available to them under the applicable national law, including the possibility 
to present evidence, to request the appointment of experts or expert examination and hearing 
of witnesses, and to request the EPPO to obtain such measures on behalf of the defence.153 
Such a regulation of defence rights on the basis of domestic law is in line with the hybrid nature 
of the EPPO. As argued by Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi, however, if such a complementarity of 
domestic law can be “practically favorable for rights”, the envisaged system “may become 
extremely dysfunctional and ineffective for individuals concerned, due to its high complexity 
brought forth not only by the combination of EU and national law, but also by the multitude of 
applicable national provisions. Moreover, it does not ensure legal certainty or foreseeability for 
suspects and defendants in order to enable effective defense patterns, neither does it avert 
the risk of patchwork proceedings that allow the subsistence of different levels of protection 
within the same criminal procedure, even when it refers to the same right…”154  
In order to temper similar consequences, the draft Regulation provides for two further levels 
of protection – on the EU plane – of the rights of the persons involved in the proceedings of 
the EPPO. First, the activities of the Office shall be carried out “in full compliance with the rights 
of suspects and accused persons enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, including the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence”.155 Among others, 
the right to ne bis in idem deserves particular attention, since the establishment of the EPPO 
could pose risks of double prosecution both at the national and at the supranational level. 
Therefore, the draft Regulation provides that if the EPPO “decides to exercise its competence, 
the competent national authorities shall not exercise their own competence in respect of the 
same criminal conduct”.156 Likewise, the draft Regulation also prohibits OLAF to “open any 
parallel administrative investigation into the same facts”157 where the EPPO decides to open a 
case.  
                                                     
152 For further considerations on EPPO and human rights see also Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (2017forthcoming).  
153 Article 35(3) draft Regulation. The possibility to present evidence and to request the appointment of experts 
or hearing of witness was provided for in the Commission’s proposal but it was subsequently removed from the 
text. It has been introduced again in the last version of the draft Regulation currently available.  
154 Kaiafa-Gbandi (2015), pp. 245-246 (emphasis added). 
155 Article 35(1) draft Regulation (emphasis added). 
156 Article 20(1) draft Regulation.  
157 Article 57a(2) draft Regulation.  
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Apart from the Charter, the draft Regulation refers to the Directives on the rights of the 
individuals in criminal proceedings recently adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council pursuant to Article 82(2) TFEU, namely those concerning: the right to interpretation 
and translation;158 the right to information and access to the case materials;159 the right to 
access to a lawyer and the right to communicate with and have third persons informed in case 
of detention;160 the right to remain silent and to be presumed innocent;161 and the right to legal 
aid.162  
On the one hand, some provisions of these Directives could have direct effect, should they not 
be implemented correctly or on time by the member states. This could reduce the imbalance 
between the direct applicability of EU law as far as the prosecution side is concerned and the 
absence of a directly applicable EU legislation on defence rights. On the other hand, however, 
the regulation of procedural safeguards of the suspects and accused persons seems 
unsatisfactory. Most of the provisions of the Directives represent a compromise among the 
member states. Therefore, the content of the rights provided therein is often quite broad and 
vague, with the consequence that the impact of those instruments on the national legal 
systems risks to be all in all quite limited; this means that “suspects and accused will continue 
to be subject to different standards depending on the applicable national law”.163  
For instance, the Directive on legal aid only introduces general and broad duties for the 
member states, such as that to “ensure that suspects and accused persons who lack sufficient 
resources to pay for the assistance of a lawyer have the right to legal aid when the interests of 
justice so require”.164 Likewise, it is provided that the legal aid system should be of adequate 
quality.165 In other words, member states still enjoy a relevant margin of discretion in the 
implementation of this Directive. Moreover, a relevant practical problem that the investigations 
of the EPPO will probably pose is that of the costs of the defence. If a person is required to 
                                                     
158 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L280, 
26.10.2010. 
159 Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L142, 1.6.2012. 
160 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant 
proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with 
third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ L294, 6.11.2013. The right of access to a 
lawyer is also enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (“Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended 
and represented”). 
161 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening 
of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal 
proceedings, OJ L65, 11.3.2016. Article 48(1) of the Charter expressly mentions the presumption of innocence 
(“Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”). 
162 Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on legal aid for 
suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant 
proceedings, OJ L297, 4.11.2016. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter, “Legal aid shall be made available to those 
who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. 
163 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 35. 
164 Article 4(1) Directive (EU) 2016/1919. 
165 Article 7 Directive (EU) 2016/1919. 
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exercise his(her) right of defence with regard to investigations carried out in different countries, 
it can be easily understood the reason why this issue will raise several concerns and it seems 
unlikely that an adequate solution can be found in the general provisions of the Directive on 
legal aid.166  
The choice of making the draft Regulation refer to the Charter, to the applicable national law, 
and to the Directives shows once more the will not to put forward any new EU regulation on 
the matter and to limit as much as possible the impact of the body on national systems. 
9.2 Judicial review 
The issue of the rights of the suspects and accused persons is strictly interlinked with that of 
the judicial review of the acts of the EPPO. In that regard, the Commission’s proposal provides 
that, for the purposes of judicial review, the EPPO has to be considered a national authority, 
with the consequence that only national courts would be competent to rule on its acts.167 This 
provision ignited a lively debate, since many authors, experts and politicians argued that a 
European body should have been submitted to the control of the European Court of Justice.  
A balance has been found in the Council. The current draft Regulation, such as the 
Commission’s proposal, provides that decisions of the EPPO having legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties shall be subject to the review of competent national courts.168 The same applies to the 
failure of the EPPO to adopt a procedural act – having the same effect vis-à-vis third parties – 
which the EPPO is required to adopt on the basis of the Regulation.169  
However, the Court of Justice has been made competent to rule on the decisions of the EPPO to 
dismiss the case. If such decisions are based on the grounds provided by Union law, they are 
subject to procedures provided for by the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, i.e. the 
provision that allows natural or legal persons to institute proceedings before the Court against 
an act addressed or which is of direct and individual concern to them. Second, the Court of 
Justice has been expressly recognised the power to give preliminary rulings concerning: i) the 
validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, “insofar as such a question of validity is raised before 
any court or tribunal of a Member State directly on the basis of Union law”;170 ii) “the 
interpretation or the validity of provisions of Union law”,171 including the Regulation; and iii) 
                                                     
166 On the practical problems linked with the expectedly high costs of the defence in the frame of the activities of 
the EPPO, see Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (2013), p. 6; European Criminal Bar Association (2013), 
pp. 195-196. 
167 Article 36 Commission’s proposal. 
168 Article 36(1) draft Regulation. 
169 Ibid.  
170 Article 36(2)(a) draft Regulation.  
171 Article 36(2)(b) draft Regulation.  
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the interpretation of the Articles of the Regulation which delimit the material competence of 
the EPPO.172  
Even though the draft Regulation takes the Commission’s proposal a step further toward EU 
scrutiny of the decisions and acts of the EPPO, a closer look shows that this development is all 
in all quite limited.  
In fact, the competence of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation 
or validity of the Regulation, including its Articles on the material competence of the EPPO, was 
already uncontested on the basis of EU law. Since the Regulation will be an act of the Council, 
the competence of the Court of Justice to rule on its interpretation or validity comes from 
Article 267(1)(b) TFEU, rather than from the provisions of the EPPO Regulation. The preliminary 
ruling on the validity of the procedural acts of the EPPO, however, was not provided for by the 
original proposal. Such a competence of the Court of Justice comes into consideration only 
when the question of validity is raised “on the basis of Union law”. Therefore, this seems to 
imply that, for instance, a procedural act of the EPPO can be subject to a preliminary reference 
when a national tribunal has reason to believe that this act violates general principles of EU 
law, fundamental rights, the Treaties or even the Regulation itself.  
Moreover, as mentioned, the Council has decided to raise at the EU level the scrutiny on the 
decisions of the EPPO to dismiss the case, “insofar as they are contested directly on the basis 
of Union law”.173 As discussed above, the Regulation lists some grounds to dismiss the case, 
and one could imagine that the judicial review of the decisions at stake could be triggered 
because the case has been closed on the basis of a ground which is not provided for by the 
Regulation or because this decision has been taken in breach of the procedures thereof.  
The power of the Court of Justice to review the decisions to dismiss a case is consistent with 
the current envisaged structure of the EPPO: such a decision is taken at the EU level by the 
Permanent Chambers, so that it is reasonable to make it subject to the control of the Court of 
Luxembourg. For the very same reason, however, one could wonder why the other decisions 
taken by the Permanent Chambers cannot be reviewed at the EU level. A tentative (political) 
answer on the special consideration paid to the dismissal decisions could be linked with the 
mission of the EPPO: since the EPPO is meant to bridge over the current deficiencies of the fight 
against crimes affecting EU financial interests, the choice not to launch the prosecution has to 
be revised at the EU level in order to avoid that cases are unreasonably dropped.  
                                                     
172 Article 36(2)(c) draft Regulation. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the Court of Justice is also 
competent in any dispute concerning: i) compensation for damage caused by the EPPO; ii) arbitration clauses 
contained in contracts concluded by the EPPO; and iii) staff-related matters (respectively, Article 36(4), (5), and 
(6) draft Regulation). The Court of Justice has jurisdiction on the dismissal of the European Chief Prosecutor and 
of European Prosecutors, too (Article 36(7) draft Regulation). Finally, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 
263 TFEU, the Court is competent to review the decisions of the EPPO which are not procedural acts, such as those 
dismissing the EDPs or concerning data protection (Article 36(8) draft Regulation). 
173 For further considerations on the judicial review of the EPPO’s dismissal decisions see Gölher (2015), pp. 102-
125. 
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In conclusion, it is clear that the EU legislator is called on to strike a very delicate balance in the 
matter at stake. On the one hand, the need to guarantee a uniform application of the EU rules 
concerning the European investigations would call for the scrutiny of the Court of Justice. It 
would be quite odd, under a constitutional point of view, to establish an EU body which is not 
under the control of the Court of Luxembourg. In that regard, the compromise found in the 
Council could still be considered unsatisfactory: pursuant to Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, the 
Court of Justice is empowered to review the legality of acts of EU bodies intended to produce 
legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and to rule on the failure to act of those bodies, so that the 
limitations to such a competence enshrined in the draft Regulation do not sit very well with 
these provisions.174 
On the other hand, however, the European review of all the acts of the EPPO could be less 
convenient for the parties (especially the private ones) to the proceedings, not least because 
of possibly higher costs and of serious risks of prolonging the procedures far beyond a 
reasonable time. Moreover, since the decisions of the Office are mostly based on domestic law, 
it does not seem unreasonable to allow national authorities to review the validity of the EPPO’s 
acts and decisions.  
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the Parliament has submitted that “in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of judicial review in line with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and with the Treaties, any operational decision affecting third 
parties taken by the EPPO should be subject to judicial review before a competent national 
court”.175 Aware of the questionable legitimacy of an EU body which would not be accountable 
to the Court of Justice, the Parliament has also added that “judicial review by the European 
Court of Justice should be possible”.176   
10. Relations with the partners 
Articles 56ff. of the draft Regulation deal with the relations of the EPPO with its partners. In line 
with the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which has bestowed upon the Council the 
power of concluding international agreements, the EPPO is only entitled to conclude working 
arrangements with other EU bodies, third countries or international organisations.177  
Specifically, the EPPO is required to establish and maintain a close relationship with Europol, 
Eurojust and OLAF, even though the privileged partner of EPPO should be Eurojust. In an 
admittedly obscure way, Article 86 TFEU provides that the EPPO has to be established “from 
Eurojust”. According to the draft Regulation, the Office is a separate entity from Eurojust but 
the two bodies shall develop “operational, administrative and management links between 
                                                     
174 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 38.  
175 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 October 2016, cit., para. 5 (emphasis added).  
176 Ibid.  
177 See Article 56(2a) draft Regulation. A similar provision can be found in Article 23(4) Europol Regulation. 
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them”.178 As far as operational matters are concerned, the EPPO can associate Eurojust with its 
activities concerning cross-border cases, for example by sharing information and personal data 
according to the provisions of the Regulation.179 The Office shall also have indirect access to 
the case management system of Eurojust, so that the EPPO will only be empowered to know 
whether Eurojust is dealing or has dealt with the same case, but it will not be authorised to 
consult directly the files stored at Eurojust.180 Finally, even though the two bodies are separate, 
they should have close relations, including in administrative matters, and the EPPO may “rely 
on the support and resources of the administration of Eurojust”.181  
Article 86(2) TFEU also mentions Europol, stating that the EPPO shall carry out its activities 
“where appropriate in liaison with Europol…”. Therefore, when necessary, the EPPO shall resort 
to the analytical and strategic competences of this agency, as provided in Article 58 of the draft 
Regulation. Article 86 TFEU does not mention OLAF. However, the draft Regulation goes beyond 
the silence of the Treaties and deals with the relations between the latter and the EPPO. The 
Office shall have an indirect access to OLAF’s case management system (as it is with Eurojust)182 
and OLAF can be requested by the Office to provide information, analyses, expertise and 
operational support, as well as to conduct administrative investigations or to facilitate 
coordination of specific actions of the competent national administrative authorities and EU 
bodies.183  
Unlike the original proposal, the current draft Regulation contains an Article concerning the 
relations with the member states that will not be part of the EPPO. This provision will play a 
relevant role for the everyday functioning of the Office, in light of the realistic establishment of 
the EPPO by means of enhanced cooperation and of the opt-out of Ireland, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. On the basis of working arrangements to be concluded by the EPPO and non-
participating member states, the latter could post liaison officers to the EPPO and the Office 
can designate contact points in the non-participating member states.184 The same possibility 
on such an ‘exchange of personnel’ is provided in the Article concerning the relations of the 
EPPO with third countries and international organisations.185 This regulation mirrors the 
                                                     
178 Article 57(1) draft Regulation. The cooperation with Eurojust, as well as the need for the EPPO to rely on its 
support, is mentioned also in Article 3 draft Regulation.  
179 Article 57(2)(a) draft Regulation.  
180 “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office shall have indirect access on the basis of a hit/no-hit system to 
information in Eurojust’s case management system. Whenever a match is found between data entered into the 
case management system by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and data held by Eurojust, the fact that there 
is a match will be communicated to both Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the 
Member State which provided the data to Eurojust” (Article 57(3) draft Regulation).  
181 Article 57(5) draft Regulation.  
182 Article 57a(5) draft Regulation is phrased in a very similar way to Article 57(3) (see above, footnote 181). 
183 Article 57a(3) draft Regulation. For further considerations on the relations of the EPPO with OLAF, Europol, and 
Eurojust see also Weyembergh, Armada and Brière (2014), pp. 43-56; Marletta (2016), pp. 143-144. 
184 Article 59a draft Regulation.  
185 Article 59(1) and (2) draft Regulation.  
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existing situation at Eurojust, where some third countries have posted liaison officers and which 
has contact points in more than 40 countries.186 
The relations with third countries and with non-participating member states pose a common 
problem: should the EPPO be regarded as a competent authority for the purposes of 
implementation of the instruments concerning judicial cooperation? In other words, should the 
EPPO be allowed to issue and receive requests for mutual legal assistance or extradition? With 
regard to relations with third countries, the Commission’s proposal answered in the affirmative 
and introduced an obligation for the member states either to “recognise the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office as a competent authority for the purpose of the implementation of their 
international agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition, or, where 
necessary, [to] alter those international agreements to ensure that the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office can exercise its functions on the basis of such agreements…”.187 The current 
draft Regulation is more complicated and provides different scenarios. 
First, with regard to third countries, any possibility for the EPPO to intervene in the field of 
extradition has been removed from the text. It is now provided that “[w]here it is necessary to 
request the extradition of a person the European Delegated Prosecutor handling the case may 
request the competent authority of his/her Member State to issue an extradition request in 
accordance with applicable treaties and/or national law”.188 Once more, the negotiations have 
watered down the original provisions and the forthcoming EPPO will not be attributed any 
additional or new power in the field. Quite curiously, this provision mirrors the new regulation 
of the pre-trial arrest during the investigations of the EPPO: as mentioned, if the person is in a 
different member state from that of the EDP handling the case, the latter will have to ask the 
surrender of the suspect by means of an EAW. When the deprivation of liberty of a person is 
brought to the fore, therefore, the EPPO does not play any peculiar role but relies entirely on 
national systems and existing rules. However, apart from extradition, the EPPO can be 
recognised as the competent authority in all the other matters of legal assistance with regard 
to third countries, according to the detailed rules to be found in the draft Regulation.189  
Second, as far as the non-participating member states are concerned, during the negotiations 
it was suggested that the member states establishing the EPPO could have recognised the 
Office as the competent authority for the purposes of implementation of the applicable Union 
acts on judicial cooperation in their relations with non-participating member states. However, 
the final version of the current draft Regulation does not feature this provision, even though 
                                                     
186 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/Partners/Pages/third-states.aspx. 
187 Article 59(4) Commission’s proposal.  
188 Article 59(7) draft Regulation (emphasis added). 
189 See Article 59(3) and (4) draft Regulation. The matter is extremely sensitive, because it could also happen that 
third countries do not accept the EPPO as a competent authority. Therefore, the draft Regulation deems it 
appropriate to set out detailed rules concerning the EPPO’s relations with third countries. See also the – admittedly 
long – recital no. 102a of the Preamble to the draft Regulation.  
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some states had suggested reintroducing it.190 As noted by Weyembergh & Brière, a “literal 
interpretation of this paragraph would mean that once recognised as a competent authority by 
the participating MSs the EPPO would autonomously rely on EU instruments to cooperate with 
non-participating MSs. Such possibility would definitely strengthen the effectiveness of the 
cooperation between the EPPO and non-participating MSs”.191 In light of the political 
sensitiveness of the matter, it is not surprising that further indications on the relations of the 
EPPO with non-participating member states can be found in recital no. 102aa of the draft 
Regulation. It restates, first, that the Regulation shall not bind those states. Second, it adds that 
the Commission should, if appropriate, submit proposals in order to ensure effective judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters between the EPPO and the non-participating member states. 
This should in particular concern the rules relating to legal assistance in criminal matters and 
surrender, in full respect of the Union acquis and of the duty of sincere cooperation, enshrined 
in Article 4(3) TFEU.192  
Finally, the draft Regulation envisages a fundamental role for Eurojust in the coordination of 
the investigations of the EPPO when non-participating member states are involved: Eurojust 
can be invited to provide support in the transmission of the EPPO’s decisions or requests for 
mutual legal assistance to, and execution in, those member states.193 
In conclusion, the current draft Regulation has paid more attention to the relations of the EPPO 
with the partners – especially the other EU bodies – than the Commission’s proposal; however, 
it has reduced the innovations that the forthcoming Office could have brought in the existing 
panorama of EU criminal law. 
11. Conclusion 
This contribution has discussed some of the most contentious features of the forthcoming 
EPPO, as it is envisaged in the current draft Regulation. The establishment of this body was 
strenuously supported by the Commission and, after years of political and academic debate, a 
proposal for a Regulation was eventually issued in July 2013 (section 2). Nevertheless, some 
doubts on the real need of the EPPO are still raised, especially because of the lack of a clear 
picture of the phenomenon that the EPPO aims at tackling, i.e. crimes affecting the financial 
interests of the EU, and because the current scenario of EU criminal law seems now better 
equipped to fight against (cross-border) criminality than it was 20 years ago (section 3). For 
example, agencies aimed at enhancing the cooperation of judicial and police authorities of 
member states have been created (Eurojust and Europol), the powers of the European office 
                                                     
190 See Article 59a(3) and footnote 82 to Article 59a in the version of the draft regulation of 12 October 2016 
(Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Completed text, 
Council doc. 12774/2/16, 12 October 2016). 
191 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 47.  
192 The non-participating member states will still have the duty to guarantee an adequate protection of the EU 
financial interests also pursuant to Article 325 TFEU (ibid., p. 46).  
193 Article 57(2)(b) draft Regulation.  
38 | FABIO GIUFFRIDA 
 
competent to carry out administrative investigations on fraud affecting the EU budget (OLAF) 
have been expanded, legal instruments laying down rules to streamline the procedures of 
extradition and of transmitting evidence from one country to another have been adopted, etc. 
Rather than establishing a brand new body with an unclear added value, especially if the number 
of member states willing to set it up will be limited, it could be more appropriate to enhance the 
current instruments and bodies. 
In fact, it is already clear that, should the EPPO finally be created, some member states will not 
take part in it, at least at the initial stage. Enhanced cooperation is therefore the most realistic 
way to set up the Office (section 4). However, because the interest at stake is inherently 
European, the participation of as many member states as possible is highly desirable; in that 
regard, in the negotiations it has emerged that enhanced cooperation will hardly be launched 
if fewer than 20 member states support the EPPO.  
The functioning of the EPPO will be characterised by a high degree of interplay between EU law 
and national law; the crux of the matter is self-evident: the more national law is brought to the 
fore to regulate the functioning of the EPPO, the more the supra-national nature of the Office is 
watered down, with the subsequent risk that the EPPO adds little value to the existing scenario 
of judicial cooperation.  
The boundaries of the competence of the EPPO will be set out by national laws. Crimes affecting 
the EU budget will indeed be defined by national legislation, which will be harmonised to a 
limited extent by the forthcoming PIF Directive:  the enduring discrepancies among the national 
criminal justice systems can therefore represent an obstacle to the effectiveness of the activities 
of the EPPO.  After lengthy debates in the Council, it has been agreed that the Office shall be 
competent also with regard to VAT fraud which is connected with the territory of two or more 
member states and involves a total damage of at least €10 million. The threshold was believed 
to be too high by the Parliament and the Commission, but the agreed text will probably not be 
altered (section 5).  
Moreover, the current structure of the forthcoming body looks much more complex than it was 
in the Commission’s proposal. The Office shall in fact be organised at a central level and at a 
decentralised level. The latter consists of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs), at least 
two per each member state participating into the EPPO: they will be part of national 
prosecution services and, simultaneously, members of the EPPO. Therefore, when they carry 
out their activities beyond the sphere of PIF crimes, they continue to be national prosecutors 
for all intents and purposes, whereas when they wear the ‘European hat’ they have to follow 
instructions from the central Office.  
The central Office is composed of the College, the European Chief Prosecutor, the Permanent 
Chambers and the European Prosecutors. Composed of one European Prosecutor per member 
state, the College does not have operational powers in individual cases and is the management 
body of the EPPO. The Permanent Chambers shall direct the activities of the European Delegated 
Prosecutors, who carry out the investigations and put in practice in their member state the 
decisions taken at the EU level by the Permanent Chambers. The activities of the European 
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Delegated Prosecutors shall also be supervised by a European Prosecutor, in principle that from 
their same member state. 
The multiple layers provided in the draft Regulation sit very well with the will of the member 
states to preserve their sovereignty as much as possible on the one hand, but they run counter 
to the need of the EPPO to function in a smooth and efficient way on the other hand (section 
6). Therefore, the EPPO would benefit from a simplification of the currently envisaged structure. 
This work has shown that, during the investigations, the EDPs carry out most of the necessary 
activities whereas the Permanent Chambers intervene mainly in ‘crisis situations’. For example, 
if the EDP does not follow the instructions of the central Office, they can reallocate the case; if 
there is not an agreement on the measures to be adopted in cross-border cases, they decide 
on the issue. 
In addition, the role of the European Delegated Prosecutors is further enhanced in comparison 
with the Commission’s proposal, since the concept of ‘single legal area’ has been removed from 
the text. According to the original text, the territory of the EU member states had to be 
considered a ‘single legal area’ for the purposes of EPPO investigations and prosecutions. The 
consequence was that the EPPO could have functioned as a unique prosecution authority 
throughout the EU and that it should have been able to give orders and directions to the 
members of its Office without the need to resort to the instruments of mutual recognition. In 
the current draft Regulation, the concept has been set aside and the logic of mutual recognition 
will be called to play a relevant role in the frame of the EPPO’s activities, even though the 
establishment of this body was meant to leave behind similar logic and to introduce a minimum 
degree of integration of the national criminal justice systems. Therefore, the legal fiction of the 
‘single legal area’ shall be reintroduced in the draft Regulation, in order to guarantee that the 
EPPO can carry out its tasks swiftly and efficiently (section 7).  
This contribution has then highlighted that, at the end of the EPPO investigations, all the relevant 
decisions shall be taken by the Permanent Chambers, with the exception of that to bring a case 
to judgment; the latter decision is made by the European Delegated Prosecutor handling the 
case and the Chamber cannot but rubber-stamp it. If this is in line with the need to guarantee 
a European response to PIF offences, it has been shown that the gap between the level where 
the decisions are made (EU level/Permanent Chamber) and the level where actions have to be 
taken (national level/EDPs) could pose several problems and potentially paralyse the body 
(section 8).  
The issue of procedural safeguards has subsequently been discussed. In addition to the 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the rights of the persons involved in the 
proceedings of the EPPO shall be protected by means of national laws, which include those 
provisions adopted for the implementation of the recent Directives on procedural rights. 
However, once more, the degree of harmonisation of these instruments is very limited and the 
individuals will enjoy different protection according to the applicable national law (section 9.1). 
Likewise, judicial review of the acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties shall be carried out by national courts, whereas the scrutiny of the Court of Justice has 
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been limited to the decisions of the Office to dismiss a case. The Court has been empowered to 
give preliminary rulings on the validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, in so far as such a 
question of validity is raised directly on the basis of Union law (section 9.2). However, it would 
be necessary to extend the control of the Court of Justice at least on the choice – to be adopted 
by the Permanent Chamber – of the member state where the trial following the EPPO’s 
investigations will take place.  
Finally, the relations of the EPPO with its partners (EU bodies, third countries, international 
organisations and non-participating member states) will be regulated by working arrangements 
to be concluded by the Office. The privileged partner of the EPPO shall be Eurojust and the 
strong relations between the two bodies would have suggested that they shared the seat in 
The Hague. However, the likely non-participation of the Netherlands in the establishment of 
the Office makes this arrangement quite unrealistic (section 10).  
In sum, the EPPO could represent an extremely important step forward in the path of an 
increasing integration and its establishment is underpinned by an obvious and praiseworthy 
reason, namely to better protect the EU budget and, consequently, taxpayers. However, in light 
of the current draft Regulation the EPPO looks like a king without a kingdom: it can adopt 
relevant decisions without a common legal area where it can exercise its powers and without 
even relying on a homogenous, European corpus of rules. Investigations and prosecutions will 
be regulated mainly by national laws and carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors, 
whereas only the decisional and key moments have been lifted at the supranational level. The 
lack of EU-wide rules of substantive and procedural criminal law makes the activities of the 
EPPO dependent on – and constrained by – national laws more than it would be necessary for 
a body which aims to be a strong and efficient supranational Prosecutor’s Office.  
Some suggestions have been put forward in this work and had already been voiced in academic 
and political fora. They could be endorsed by the member states which will show their 
commitment to the establishment of the Office in the enhanced cooperation. Should this not 
be the case, the words of the current Director-General of OLAF should be kept in mind: “Setting 
up an EPPO only makes sense if this body can protect the interests of the EU better than the 
systems currently being used, and if it, therefore, will benefit EU citizens’”.194 It is contentious 
that the Office – with the currently envisaged structure and powers – could significantly 
improve the fight against PIF offences. Should the enhanced cooperation lead to envisaging an 
EPPO which does not appear satisfactory and efficient, the alternative of strengthening the 
existing instruments and bodies rather than establishing a brand new body should be 
adequately taken into account.  
  
                                                     
194 Kessler (2016), pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).  
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